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Paved with Good Intentions 
HMCS Uganda, the Pacific War, 
and the Volunteer Issue 
Bill Rawling 
A dmirals and politicians alike must have winced at the headlines: "PACIFIC 
SERVICE PROTEST" was splashed across the 
Daily Sketch; "PACIFIC? NOT US!" proclaimed 
the Evening News, in one of the worst public 
relations disasters the Royal Canadian Navy 
faced during the Second World War. As the two 
newspapers - among many others - explained, 
the crew of one ofCanada's two cruisers, HMCS 
Uganda, while on operations in the Pacific 
theatre, refused to volunteer for further service 
when requested, forcing the ship to return to 
port. There were, however, no accusations of 
cowardice or disloyalty, either explicit or 
implied; rather, the press explained, "The 
crew ... had volunteered for service anywhere 
when they enlisted originally. They resented 
being asked to volunteer again." The result was 
that, when war ended in the Pacific on 14 
August 1945, Canada had no ship to represent 
it there, despite plans that at one point had 
called for a fleet of 60 war vessels. 
The RCN had sought to build a balanced fleet 
since its inception in 1910, and its hopes seemed 
to be taking steps towards fruition with the 
commissioning of HMCS Uganda on Trafalgar 
Day, 1944. Soon complete with a complement of 
900, the Fiji-class cruiser then made its way to 
the United Kingdom for trials in January 1945, 
and proceeded to the Mediterranean for further 
training. Joining the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) 
in the first days of April, Canada's sole 
representative in that theatre helped fight off 
kamikaze attacks and engaged land targets with 
its nine six-inch guns as part of the BPF's 
supporting role in the US invasion of Okinawa. 
After a month of such operations, Uganda 
seemed to be fitting in well with the Royal Navy 
task force, though the threat of suicide attack 
never failed to generate much discussion on the 
art and science of survival in the face of a 
determined foe. 
The enemy was not, however, Uganda's only 
concern at this time, political developments at 
home promised to affect the ship's destiny. 
Canada's wartime navy was made up entirely of 
volunteers (or general service- GS- personnel), 
as was its air force, and these could be sent to 
any theatre of war as determined by operational 
requirements. But, in late March 1945, there were 
intimations in Cabinet that, with the defeat of 
Hitler near, the scale of Canada's contribution to 
the fight against totalitarianism would diminish 
somewhat. Government policy would thus place 
limitations on what could be done with Canadians 
serving in the RCN. On the 22nd, with the Prime 
Minister absent due to illness, the War Committee 
was informed of his Views: 
The Secretary reported that the Prime Minister 
proposed to make a short statement in 
Parliament, in the near future, on the 
government's intentions as to Canadian 
participation in the war against Japan ... The 
statement would inform the House that there 
would be no conscription for service in the 
Pacific, that Naval and Air Force units to be 
despatched to that theatre would be constituted 
on a voluntary basis, and that the Army 
contingent would be made up of volunteers, plus 
short service GS personnel; no difficulty was 
anticipated in obtaining the numbers of 
personnel required for any of the three 
Services. 1 
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Two views of HMCS Uganda, November 1944. 
Subsequent meetings agreed that King's 
proposed statement would require substantial 
revisions, "particularly in relation to those 
paragraphs which dealt with the method of 
selecting personnel for the Pacific contingents; 
in this respect government policy was not 
clear."2 
Some ambiguity was perhaps necessary to 
maintain Cabinet solidarity, for ministers had 
been bitterly divided on the conscription issue in 
the past, and King wanted to avoid the kind of 
acrimony that had led to the resignation of the 
minister of defence the previous year. At the end 
of the month, according to the prime minister's 
diary, 
24 
I brought up a statement drafted by Heeney 
and Pope regarding Canada's contribution in the 
Japanese war. It raised the old question of 
conscription anew. Macdonald [minister of 
defence for the naval services] in particular 
maintained that we must have conscription on 
principle. Ilsley also stated strongly that he was 
indifferent. Either the govemment should have 
conscription of NRMA men for Japan as well as 
volunteers for general service, or else have 
avowedly an indefinite statement as to 
numbers, but an avowed statement as to no 
(Photos by US Navy, NAC PA 107875 & 115789) 
conscription for the Japanese war .. .I spoke of 
my talk with the President, in which he spoke 
of our navy possibly controlling the Kuriles and 
our soldiers helping to drive the Japanese out 
of Manchuria and other parts of China, and 
how I had felt indignant at his even proposing 
anything of the kind ... ! took strongly the 
position that to create a conscription issue over 
Japan before a general election would be just 
suicidal and absolutely wrong ... [McNaughton] 
stated emphatically that we should include 
mention that no one would be sent overseas 
until after their return to Canada and a 
month's vacation here .. .I pointed out that the 
mere desire of having token contribution for 
prestige purposes was not sufficient reason for 
raising the conscription issue or indeed 
needlessly sacrificing lives. 
It was finally decided to have Pope, Heeny 
and the Chiefs of Staff revise the memo in light 
of the discussion, making clear that whatever 
was done for the Japanese war would be on a 
voluntary basis, thereby avoiding the question 
of conscription of NRMA men or voluntary 
enlistment or any pressure of general service 
men for voluntary enlistment. It was suggested 
that the army contribution might be made up of 
men who would wish to be permanently in the 
army. 
I am coming to feel that if the worst comes 
to the worst, rather than have the issue of 
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conscription raised in the election, I would cut 
out any contribution from the army, especially 
as we would be retaining one or two divisions 
for a couple of years in Europe ... Macdonald was 
left by himself in arguing for conscription. He 
made the statement he would only be in the 
government for a short time longer in any 
event ... Certainly there will be no conscription 
for the Far East in any government of which I 
may be the head. 3 
The main contention seemed to be whether or 
not to conscript men into the army's Far East 
contingent, which would not affect the RCN's 
contribution in any way, but the whole issue of 
what constituted a "volunteer" was about to come 
under closer scrutiny, with serious repercussions 
on Uganda. 
The issue evolved quickly in the first days of 
April, with Cabinet quietly assenting that there 
would be no mention of conscription in the prime 
minister's upcoming statement in the House. It 
was still, however, left to determine whether "the 
general service men were to be considered as 
having enlisted for Japan or whether they would 
have to re-volunteer to go into the war against 
Japan."4 The final decision on the matter was 
communicated in King's speech to the House 
of Commons the next day: 
These navy, army and air force contingents 
will be formed in part from personnel now 
serving abroad and in part from personnel now 
training in Canada. It is not intended to detail 
men for service in the Pacific. This applies to 
general service personnel as well as to all others. 
The men to make up whatever military force is 
to be employed against Japan will be chosen 
from those who elect to serve in the Pacific 
theatre. 
No one serving in the European theatre will 
proceed to the Pacific without first having the 
opportunity of coming home. All personnel 
returning from abroad will be granted thirty 
day's disembarkation leave, in addition to any 
normal leave to which they may become entitled 
during their period of duty in Canada while the 
several forces are being reorganized.5 
Thus only those specifically volunteering for 
Pacific duty would be sent to that theatre. 
In the debate that followed, Angus Macdonald, 
the navy minister, was asked how this would apply 
to ships already in the Pacific (i.e. Uganda), and 
he replied simply that all members of the RCN 
were volunteers; when pressed, however, he 
answered in a slightly different vein: 
That ship has been in commission now for 
six months, and I should think that during the 
summer or fall, assuming the European war to 
25 
3
Rawling: Paved with Good Intentions: HMCS Uganda, the Pacific War, and the
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1995
be over, if some men on board the Uganda feel 
they should return home, we would allow them 
to do so if we felt that we could replace them. 
Perhaps I should not make that broad statement, 
but I should think very sympathetic 
consideration would be given any man on the 
Uganda who, having put in a year of service on 
that ship, and the European war being over, 
wished to return to civilian life. I think such a 
request would be very carefully and 
sympathetically dealt with.6 
No one in the House seems to have noticed that 
Macdonald's reply was, in fact, a contradiction of 
the policy the prime minister had just presented. 
A Conservative MP, however, John Diefenbaker, 
did point out that sorting out the volunteer issue 
aboard Uganda might be more difficult than the 
navy minister was letting on. 7 
Macdonald's role in the affair is of some 
interest, especially when one considers that, as 
navy minister, it does not seem to have occurred 
to him that his government's insistence on sending 
to the Pacific only those who specifically 
volunteered to serve there might create problems. 
His performance in the House, where he seems 
to have forgotten that Uganda's crew could either 
decline to volunteer or return to Canada for 30 
days' leave, also casts doubt on his ability to focus 
on naval issues. One can surmise that his heart 
was no longer in his job, Macdonald having 
decided as early as 1943 not to stand for re-
election, no doubt partly due to the strains of war 
that took a toll of many policy makers. 
Naval Service Headquarters (NSHQ) was 
another matter, and had not been taken 
completely by surprise by the government's 
volunteer policy. As early as the previous 
November, staff officers had considered the 
possible ramifications of using volunteers, and 
had attempted to determine how long it would 
take to find crews for the Pacific ships. According 
to their hypothetical plan, as soon as 
authorization came from Cabinet, a signal would 
be sent to ascertain who would be willing to serve 
against Japan, requiring about six weeks for 
various replies to come in; then a further two 
weeks would be needed to summarize the returns. 
Another six would allow the RCN depot to 
commence drafting crews to their vessels, with a 
further month allocated to allowing volunteers 
leave in Canada. Total time required was thus 
some five and a half months "from the date the 
26 
complement is authorized and a clear 
Government policy is released until the rating 
will actually join his ship. "8 
Having been informed of the government's 
policy to send volunteers exclusively, NSHQ thus 
required only two weeks to issue its directives: 
It is the intention that the RCN contribution 
to the war against Japan will be limited to 
modern and effective men of war such as 
cruisers, carriers, destroyers and frigates. If 
these ships are to be manned effectively, a high 
percentage of personnel at present serving, will 
be required as volunteers to enable the most 
suitable selection to be made .... 
It is therefore necessary for all repetition 
all personnel to state whether or not they are 
willing to volunteer for service in the Far East. ... 
Any who do not volunteer or who do 
volunteer but are not selected for service in the 
Pacific Theatre, will continue to serve as required 
elsewhere subject to eventual release .... 
Commanding officers are to explain the 
situation, and give all officers and ratings an 
opportunity to sign the following undertaking. 
"I hereby volunteer for service in the war against 
Japan and agree to serve in the Pacific Theatre 
and/ or any other theatre for the duration of 
hostilities should my services be so required. "9 
Some were far from sanguine as to the results, 
and "It is the general opinion of Senior Canadian 
Officers overseas that the percentage of volunteers 
will be disappointingly low. Possible early 
promulgation of the Department's intention to 
provide additional financial or other 
inducements for service in the Pacific might 
have a beneficial effect." 10 
Opposite: Aspects of crew life aboard HMCS Uganda. 
Top Left: Voluntary physical training on the 
quarterdeck of HMCS Uganda. 
(NAC PA 136082) 
Top Right: Sailors pose for a photo. 
(NAC PA 1 77922) 
Centre Left: Bags of mail come alongside HMCS 
Uganda. 
(NAC PA 136084) 
Bottom: The funeral at sea of Stoker Phillips. 
(NAC PA 132982) 
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Procedures to determine who was willing 
to serve against the Japanese were soon in 
place, instructions to the RCN's depot in the 
UK being to "interrogate every officer and rating 
reporting to HMCS Niobe and if they have not 
already recorded their decision you will obtain 
from them the requisite declaration. If they do 
not sign the declaration their names should be 
included in the negative lists."11 That was fine 
for a shore establishment, but there was a 
potential for severe complications where ships 
at sea were concerned, as suggested by the 
Canadian Naval Mission Overseas. "Information 
is also desired as to what will be the status of 
personnel in Uganda or any other Canadian 
ships such as Ontario and Prince Robert which 
may be in the Pacific theatre after the German 
defeat. Is it NSHQ's intention to replace 
personnel who do not volunteer for service in 
the Pacific and to give leave in Canada to 
Personnel who do volunteer? If this is so is it 
intended to withdraw these ships to Canada or 
deal with reliefs and leave on an individual draft 
basis?"12 An answer was not yet forthcoming. 
In early May, the RCN's plans for its fleet in 
the Pacific called for two light fleet carriers, two 
cruisers, seventeen destroyers, thirty-six 
28 
Waves crash over the bow of 
HMCS Uganda as she dips 
into a choppy sea. 
(NAC PA 136085) 
frigates, and eight corvettes, requiring 13,400 
crew with 4,000 reserves. Far more would have 
to volunteer, however, to ensure the requisite 
number could be selected, as Captain F.L. 
Houghton, Canada's Naval Liaison Officer in 
London, pointed out: 
It will be appreciated that in order to obtain 
the correct substantive and non-substantive 
rates to man ships intended for the Pacific it 
will probably be necessary for at least three-fifths 
of our present 90,000 personnel to volunteer 
for the Japanese War and it is the duty of every 
Commanding Officer to ensure that all officers 
and men are fully aware of the situation in all 
its aspects. It is only in this way that they will 
be able to make their decisions fairly and with a 
full realization of the implications. It is not a 
question of forcing men to volunteer but of giving 
them all the possible facts of the case. AB further 
information is received from NSHQ it will be 
promulgated by signal and if as a result of such 
information any personnel who previously did 
not wish to volunteer desire to change their 
minds this should be encouraged and amended 
retums forwarded. 13 
It soon became evident, however, that getting 
over 50,000 naval personnel to re-enlist would 
be no easy matter, and not just for the reasons 
anticipated by the govemment. 
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For there were rumblings within the RCN, 
Acting Lieutenant-Commander W.H. Willson, 
captain ofHMCS Kootenay, being one of the most 
vocal: 
I HAVE THE HONOUR TO SUBMIT, that 
the following complaint against instructions 
received from a superior authority may be 
considered ... The instructions that Permanent 
Force Officers are to sign undertakings for 
service in the Far East appear irregular and 
detrimental to the dignity of a Naval Officer .. .! 
do not feel that as an officer of the Royal 
Canadian Navy I should be called upon to sign a 
contract binding me to do the work which I 
joined the Service to do ... The demand that 
Officers of the Royal Canadian Navy sign this 
statement insinuates that there is some doubt 
as to whether officers holding His Majesty's 
Commission can be relied upon to do the duty 
for which, in years of peace, they are constantly 
preparing themselves .. .It is requested to know 
whether my superior officers consider me so 
lacking in sense of responsibility as to deem it 
necessary to solicit my services and require a 
contract signed before a witness to hold me to 
myduty. 14 
Commander Willson submitted a formal request 
for transfer to the Pacific in lieu of the re-
attestation. A report to the Naval Board suggested 
that "this officer undoubtedly expresses 
sentiments felt by all officers of the permanent 
RCN," and that most "have signed the required 
undertaking in good faith only because they 
understand that it is the policy of the Canadian 
Government that no officer or man may be 
appointed to serve in the Japanese War unless 
he has signed the proper form." 15 Willson was, 
however, reprimanded. 16 
The results of such ill-feeling could be seen 
in the cruiser HMCS Ontario, fitting-out for Far 
Eastern services, but which in May had not yet 
made its way to the Pacific. Canvassing found 512 
willing to fight the Japanese and 388 unwilling; 
thus "The announcement that only volunteers 
would be sent to the Pacific was catastrophic in 
its effect on draft to Ontario which had preViously 
looked forward to impending events with 
enthusiasm. "17 There was little sentiment of war-
weariness, rather a feeling that volunteers 
would lose the benefits of machinery set up for 
demobilization on a priority basis; also, many had 
already promised wives and dependents that they 
would return home as soon as possible, so felt 
uneasy about putting their names to new 
attestation papers; further, there was a general 
concern that non-volunteers would be in a more 
advantageous position when it came to getting 
post-war jobs. 18 Given the disincentives to 
volunteering, the fact that 57% of the ship's crew 
did so can be considered a major testament to 
their dedication- or sense of adventure. 
Uganda's case was far more difficult, as there 
were no replacements at hand should a large 
portion of the crew choose not to volunteer and 
those who did were still eligible for a months' leave 
in Canada. As the ship's captain, Edmond Rollo 
Mainguy, related several decades later, feelings 
aboard his cruiser echoed those of Ontario: 
We were busy shooting the Japanese islands 
and we got a signal saying that the war was over 
in Europe and we were to splice the main brace. 
We couldn't do that in the war zone so we saved 
it up. The next signal we got fairly shortly was: 
"Do you volunteer to fight against the Japanese?" 
It seemed pretty stupid. Anyway we got this 
signal. We couldn't understand what it meant. 
And after great exchange of signals, we were given 
orders finally that we had to vote. Everybody on 
board votes secretly as to whether or not they 
volunteered to fight against the Japanese. If they 
said yes, they'd get 30 days leave. Well, that 
sounded a bit improbable as we were already 
fighting. So the way this signal and exchange of 
the signal was received annoyed everybody, every 
single soul on board. The permanent force were 
insulted because they'd spent all their lives 
getting ready for a war and then, when in the 
middle of the war, we were asked whether we 
wanted to go on and finish it. All the Reserves 
and everybody else had volunteered for the 
duration of hostilities, and if we were fighting 
against Japan, of course we'd go on. So from 
one point of view, there were those two main 
incentives just to be annoyed and say, "Well, if 
we're not wanted, of course, we don't want to 
fight the Japs if it's not necessary." Then there 
were those who thought if they said yes and their 
wives heard about this, that they'd volunteered 
to go on fighting Japan when they could have 
gone home, there would be trouble there. The 
single men on board all thought a lot of people 
are going to say no and if we don't go home, 
we're going to miss out on a lot of civilian jobs, 
so we'll say no. 19 
Mainguy, like many others, described the events 
of those days over four decades after they had 
occurred, and accounts differ as to how the vote 
came about. Lieutenant Ernest Chadwick 
29 
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Captain E.R. Mainguy inspects the crew of his ship. 
suggests that the captain "decided they would 
ask anybody who did not want to volunteer to 
hand their names in and next time we refuelled 
from the fleet train we'd put them on the fleet 
train and they could go home. The troops 
actually, seemed to accept that." But officialdom 
did not, and insisted it wanted a list of those 
who did wish to volunteer; Mainguy's reaction 
was to announce, in the first days of May, that 
procedures would be implemented to determine 
who wished to serve in the war against Japan. 
What he said next is a matter of some 
confusion, for it seems that the captain noted, 
publicly, that he would have little respect for 
those who might decide to quit while the ship 
was on operations, which according to 
Chadwick, "was a bad thing. That finished it. 
And the next morning the Commander's office 
flat was just flooded with non-volunteers. "20 The 
captain's remarks may well have been a factor 
in the crew's decision, another witness insisting 
30 
(NAC PA 177921) 
in his diary that the "Skipper made speeches 
and turned the men against him more than 
ever. Called us foreflushers and quitters. Those 
who were in doubt soon made up their minds 
at a statement like that. "21 Able Seaman Andrew 
Lawson agreed, remembering that Mainguy was 
held in high regard by the crew, but that his 
speech may have put the men offnonetheless. 22 
According to another, when it was announced 
they would have to vote on whether to stay or 
leave, "everybody more or less laughed about 
it. They couldn't believe it. But the captain made 
the announcement and explained what had to 
be done. So we took the vote and the vote said, 
we were finished ... [Before the vote the captain] 
actually made some nasty remarks (which was 
probably a mistake) about anybody who didn't 
volunteer to stay there. "23 Ironically, that same 
witness, Lieutenant Hugh Makovski, also 
claimed that "As a matter of fact we would have 
had to leave about the time we did anyway, 
8
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because we had been at sea then just under a 
year [sic -actually seven months] and we had 
been travelling a good part of that time at 30-
knots. The chief engineer told Mainguy when 
he was coming home that no matter where we 
went he'd have to go in for a refit because he 
couldn't guarantee more than 20-knots when 
we left there, "24 though there is no corroborating 
evidence for this. 
Whether or not Mainguy's remarks to the crew 
affected their decision, he was not the only one to 
suggest that they still had a duty to perform. As 
Lieutenant William Landymore recalled, 
Well, I think that at some levels there was 
some bad feeling. It never occurred to me not to 
volunteer. As a regular force officer there was 
no difficulty in the decision ... And as far as my 
own activity was concerned- I called together 
all my Gunnery Chiefs and POs and I said, "It 
may occur to you, some of you who aren't regular 
force people (or permanent force we called them 
then) may feel it's better to go home and get the 
leave that's been promised and the big money 
and all that sort of stuff. But I'm sure that if you 
do, if you don't volunteer for service in the Pacific 
and if a sufficient number do that- the ship will 
have to go home. No matter what you think about 
it now, you're going to regret it all your life. You're 
going to be sorry you made that decision. 
Because it doesn't matter how you rationalize 
it, there's something in the view that, in the face 
of the enemy, you're turning your back. And I'm 
sure that if you reflect on this long enough, you'll 
decide that this isn't the way to do it. "25 
In the event, 576 ratings and 29 officers opted 
not to volunteer, one of them, Able Seamen 
Andrew A. Lawson, echoeing the views of W.H. 
Willson a month before: "Why should we volunteer 
again. We volunteered once to get here. We were 
quite happy to stay here. We'll do our job that 
we're supposed to do and then go home .. .I was 
one of the ones who did not volunteer. I was 
prepared to stay there, but if they were going 
through this nonsense of volunteering (which was 
all it was) I wasn't going to volunteer again. They 
could send me to China, Timbuctu, if they wanted, 
I belonged to them for the duration of the war."26 
Fifty years after the fact, Stephen Geneja, a 
member of Uganda's crew at the time of the 
"vote," reviewed events with some of his 
comrades, who offered additional reasons for 
refusing to volunteer. First, after entering the 
tropics, many sailors began suffering from 
respiratory problems, especially those working 
in extremely hot engine rooms. "Some of the 
stokers had served in up to five other naval ships 
in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and had not 
been bothered with any breathing problems."27 
The strains of operating in the Pacific, far from 
any home port, may have made a bad situation 
worse, Geneja reporting that a combination of 
"Absence of shore leave, dehydrated food, lack of 
fresh vegetables, fruit, and meat, a continuous 
shortage of fresh water, and too "pusser" 
[rigorous I a routine when not in action were other 
reasons given. "28 
Naturally, in the days and weeks that followed, 
there was much speculation as to what would 
happen next. 29 The Commander-in-Chief of the 
British Pacific Fleet, Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser, 
contacted NSHQ: "Understand 576 ratings of 
Uganda must be relieved in the near future as 
they are not volunteers for service in the 
Pacific .... As this is a large number, request I may 
be informed when and where the first draft of 
reliefs may be expected so that arrangements can 
be made with the least interference with 
operational readiness."30 A few days later it 
became clear that replacing two-thirds of the 
ship's crew could not be done through the normal 
channels of reliefs, and the Admiralty concurred 
in a suggestion that Uganda retum to Canada to 
take on a volunteer crew as soon as operational 
requirements allowed.31 In early June the wheels 
of naval administration turned with 
commendable efficiency, and a draft of about six 
hundred left Halifax for Esquimalt. 32 
Meanwhile, Uganda's war of shore 
bombardment and anti-kamikaze work 
continued, though morale had suffered somewhat 
when volunteering sheep had been separated from 
non-volunteering goats. The atmosphere thus 
generated "has been and remains our only major 
problem, "33 and could not have improved in early 
June when two-thirds of the crew again declined 
to volunteer when official re-attestation papers 
were presented to them. At the same time, 
headquarters in Ottawa continued to prepare to 
make a larger contribution, which near the end 
of June was estimated at two cruisers, two light 
fleet carriers, an anti-aircraft cruiser, eight 
Crescent-class destroyers, eleven other 
destroyers, and a variety of smaller craft by the 
end of March 1946.34 For the time being, British 
31 
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plans foresaw incorporating the two Canadian 
cruisers into the seven that would make up the 
4th Cruiser Squadron, which could be paired with 
the 2nd Cruiser Squadron being planned at the 
same time. 35 Ontario was expected to have 
embarked the necessary number of volunteers by 
mid-July,36 and though "some of the men did not 
get the 30-days leave they had coming to 
them ... they understand this will pile up in their 
favour for later on. "37 Uganda, having left the BPF 
on 27 July, was to work up with its new crew, off 
Canada's west coast, in the first weeks of 
September. 38 
So, by mid-summer 1945 the volunteer issue 
had proved to be a temporary setback- not a 
severe blow- to the creation of an RCN Pacific 
fleet, and on 25 July Canadians could be informed 
of developments in that regard. 
32 
HMCS Uganda will return to the Pacific 
theatre of operations in the near future, it was 
revealed today by Hon. Douglas C. Abbott, 
Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, 
in announcing the cruiser's imminent arrival at 
a West Coast Canadian Port. 
Trained replacements for those of Uganda's 
crew who did not elect to continue to serve in 
the Far East were selected some time ago, the 
Navy Minister revealed, and are now on the West 
Coast awaiting the ship. After a brief"working-
up" period in which the newly appointed 
members of the crew will familiarize themselves 
with the ship, the cruiser will be on her way to 
rejoin the British Pacific Fleet. 
Referring to Uganda's return to Canada, Mr. 
Abbott pointed out that the ship completed her 
"work-ups" early this year, joined the British 
Pacific Fleet in April, and has been in continuous 
operation in the Pacific since that time. She was 
already in Pacific waters when the government 
announced its policy of sending to the Far East 
only those who had specifically elected to serve 
there. 
In line with this policy a canvass was made 
of all naval personnel. Results of this canvass 
show to date that over 37,000 officers and 
ratings have volunteered to serve in the Pacific 
theatre [not the 50,000 hoped for]. Latest 
available information shows that approximately 
25 per cent of Uganda's crew have volunteered 
to continue to serve in that theatre. The Navy 
Minister said, however, that this figure is 
subject to revision when the ship reaches port. 
This means that provision has been made for 
the replacement of some 600 officers and men. 
The possibility of sending replacements to 
a base in the Pacific to join the ship was 
considered, the Minister said; but the British 
Commander-in-Chief felt it advisable to put 
replacements on board in Canada, where 
necessary "working-up" exercises could be 
conducted in non-operational waters. 
Mr. Abbott emphasized that Uganda was 
returning to Canada on orders of the 
Commander-in-Chief of the British Pacific Fleet 
under whose control she was operating; and that 
the order for her return had been issued on 
completion of the operations in which she was 
engaged.39 
Though the Halifax Chronicle referred to the 
affair as "an unparalleled piece of ineptitude in 
naval administration, "40 it looked as if the 
situation would soon be put right. Uganda arrived 
in Esquimalt on 10 August, 41 and would be ready 
to return to the Pacific in a few weeks, but even 
as the ship was docking two atomic bombs had 
already been dropped on Japanese cities, and on 
the 14th Emperor Hirohito broke a tie-vote in 
the Japanese Cabinet and his government decided 
to surrender. 
The dawn of the nuclear age thus dealt the 
RCN's prestige a severe blow, there being no 
Canadian naval units in the Pacific when the war 
ended. That was not, however, of much 
importance at the time, the navy's priorities being 
to acquire a balanced fleet it could retain into the 
post-war era, and with two cruisers in hand, as 
well as a light fleet carrier and modem destroyers 
on the way, it would seem that the naval service 
had achieved its goals- at least in part. 
Historically, then, the volunteer debacle is more 
important in what it says about the conscription 
issue -more critical in Canadian politics than in 
just about any other country in the world- and 
which could have bizarre consequences even in 
an all-volunteer force thousands of miles distant 
from the corridors of power. 
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Cambridge Military Library (est. 1817) 
Royal Artillery Park, Queen Street 
Halifax, Nova Scotia 
This library, possessing historic value and quiet-
spoken charm, has a large main hall complete 
with glass encasements, a frreplace, above which 
hangs a portrait of the Duke of Cambridge and 
comfortable appointments of red leather and 
carpet. A library fit for the military gentlemen 
of the 1800s, it was founded in 1817 by the 
Earl of Dalhousie with monies from the Castine 
Fund. As Halifax's first, this library has had 
its heyday of social evenings, tennis on the lawn 
and tea. Now, as the military history library 
for the area, it serves officers of the Air Force, 
Army and Navy. It has a collection of 
approximately 12,000 books. some of the 
oldest volumes belong to the Corfu Collection, 
a gift from the British Government to the officers 
of the Halifax Garrison. Most of the Main Hall 
contains about 7,000 volumes of newer material 
though, with its focus being military history. 
The library has endeavoured to make Canadian 
military history, Canadian regimental history 
and local military history its focus. The 
Collection has been used as a research library 
for various publications. The library is open 
from 0800 to 1600 hours every weekday. 
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